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I hold it a principle in Asia that the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the 
slaughter you inflict upon the enemy. 
General M.O. Skobelev 
Conqueror of Turkestan, 1881 
INTRODUCTION  
It is ironic that the words of a nineteenth-century Russian general should form an 
appropriate epitaph for Soviet military operations in Afghanistan from December 1979 
until February 1989. The nine-year occupation of Afghanistan included the employment 
of the full spectrum of Soviet conventional weapons and a diverse range of their chemical 
weapons inventory in an attempt to defeat the mujahideen (Afghan freedom fighters). In 
pursuit of this objective, Soviet military strategy underwent a process of increasing 
radicalization that eventually resulted in a sanctioned policy of punitive coercion by 
Soviet air and land forces. Airpower played a critical role in the Soviet occupation by 
providing the platforms for bombardment, chemical attack, aerial mining, troop insertion, 
fire support and resupply. The failure of the Russian-trained and supplied Afghan Army 
to eliminate the growing Muslim insurgency led Soviet operational planners to embrace 
airpower as a punitive instrument with which to bludgeon the insurgents as well as the 
Afghan populace. In fact, during the course of the conflict, airpower constituted the 
single most important means for separating the mujahideen from the population while 
attempting to coerce the insurgents into abandoning their fight.  
The Soviet experience in Afghanistan provides an instructive case study for examining 
the impact and effect of airpower in an insurgency environment. The ability of a 
relatively ill-equipped and technologically inferior opponent to force the eventual 
withdrawal of one of the world's most vaunted military powers has broader implications 
for contemporary political and military leaders. The Israeli historian Martin van Creveld 
argues that the end of the Cold War and the American victory against Iraq may signal the 
end of the conventional war paradigm.1 Whether the nature of war will change from 
largely conventional to irregular warfare is still unclear. The success of American 
airpower in the Gulf War, however, led some to embrace it as the panacea for 
contemporary conflict resolution.2 The apparent effective use of airpower in Bosnia, and 
the 78-day air campaign over Kosovo, may strengthen this perception in the minds of 
policy makers and military professionals. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan, 
however, provides a caution to this view, and clearly indicates some of the limits of 
airpower as a successful coercive instrument in the insurgency environment.  
The Soviet Air Force (VVS) entered the war in Afghanistan as a capable, well-equipped 
force focused on providing aerial assistance for combined arms operations to Soviet tank 
and mechanized forces. The three main components of the VVS in 1979 included: Frontal 
Aviation, largely concerned with the support of theater warfare in Europe; Long Range 
Aviation, the Soviet strategic bombardment force, equivalent to the former US Strategic 
Air Command bomber force; and Military Transport Aviation, the Soviet airlift force. In 
1977, Long Range Aviation consisted of 794 aircraft, Military Transport Aviation 
operated 1,500 fixed-wing aircraft and 320 helicopters, and Frontal Aviation included 
4,600 fixed-wing aircraft and 3,000 helicopters.3 In Afghanistan, Long Range Aviation 
played a limited role, while Military Transport Aviation proved at times invaluable. 
However, Frontal Aviation fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters ultimately constituted the 
key assets for the conduct of the war against the mujahideen. According to Soviet 
doctrine, Frontal Aviation constituted a critical force adjunct for the support of ground 
operations. However, in a relatively short period the VVS, and especially the forces of 
Frontal Aviation, experienced a fundamental transformation in character from "force 
adjunct" to "force substitute." As the war in Afghanistan became a prolonged conflict, the 
VVS became increasingly important as a force substitute employed to minimize Soviet 
casualties and to compensate for the comparatively small Soviet ground force. In 
addition, VVS operations in Afghanistan rapidly expanded from a primarily combined 
arms emphasis to encompass the routine employment of Soviet aviation assets as 
instruments for punishment and terror. During the nine-year occupation, the Soviets 
embarked upon a strategy centering on the use of airpower as a, if not the, primary 
instrument with which to eradicate the growing Muslim insurgency and cow the 
indigenous population through a lethal campaign of aerial bombardment.  
The Road to Intervention and Escalation  
The initial conduct of military operations in Afghanistan was reminiscent of the earlier 
Soviet success in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. British historian Mark Galeotti 
speculates that the Czechoslovakian experience framed the military and political 
expectations of the Soviet leadership for the occupation of Afghanistan in 1979.4 The 
similarities between the two operations are striking. The Soviet-led invasion of 
Czechoslovakia included an initial nighttime assault on the Prague airport.5 Meanwhile, a 
largely mechanized force of 175,000 men from various Warsaw Pact countries crossed 
the border and began to occupy the major urban centers throughout the country.6 The 
Russian plan in Afghanistan was essentially the same as that used in Czechoslovakia in 
1968, including the seizure of key airfields, government buildings, and command and 
control centers.7 There was, however, a significant difference in the size of the forces 
employed, with the Afghan operation initially employing slightly less than 50,000 Soviet 
troops.8 The belief among the Soviet leadership that its forces could quickly stabilize the 
government and then withdraw from Afghanistan, as they had done in Czechoslovakia, 
proved overly optimistic.9  
In the first phase of the occupation, Soviet forces concentrated on securing the lines of 
communication (LOCs) within Afghanistan. The unimpeded use of the Afghan highway 
system was absolutely essential for supplying Soviet forces in the country. The Soviets, 
however, experienced a number of problems due to the weather, the poor road conditions, 
lack of rail lines, and the limited number and carrying capacity of the available routes. 
One Soviet account provided the following description of the Kabul-Termez highway, the 
main highway between the USSR and the Afghan capital: "The road winds there in steep 
and narrow hairpin turns, with a perpendicular cliff on one side and an abyss on the other. 
The ice-covered route is terrible, and the thousands of trucks which cross the pass every 
day polish it to a mirror-like shine."10 The importance of the road routes for resupply 
efforts forced the Soviets to devote significant manpower and resources to their security 
and protection.11 In addition, the poor roads and the vulnerability of truck convoys to 
ambush forced the Soviets to move large quantities of supplies by helicopters to isolated 
garrisons and remote outposts -- a time consuming and often inefficient use of limited 
aerial resources.12  
While maintaining their own LOCs, the Soviet forces in Afghanistan also attempted to 
interdict the flow of supplies and manpower from Pakistan to the mujahideen. However, 
these efforts proved to be one of the most signal failures of Soviet and Democratic 
Republic of Afghanistan (hereafter DRA) forces during the war. The initial Soviet 
attempts at closing the border focused on the employment of massive firepower from 
aircraft (both fixed-wing and helicopter) and artillery to support advances by mechanized 
and armored forces. French journalist GŽrard Chaliand visited several Afghan provinces 
along the Pakistani border in 1980. He stated that "During the first six months of 1980, 
the Russians were concerned above all to control the Pakistani border region, particularly 
Kunar and Paktia, and, to a lesser degree, Ghazni provinces."13 In the push toward the 
Pakistani border, fixed-wing aircraft extensively supported these initial operations by 
providing massive firepower in the form of pre-attack bombardment and punitive 
bombing strikes with napalm and gas, while helicopters provided close air support 
including the strafing of civilians.14 In July 1980 alone, Soviet and DRA forces 
destroyed no fewer than 60 villages south of Kabul during a two-week operation.15  
Soviet attempts to intimidate the civil population involved a joint air-land effort. The 
intensive bombardment of villages by aircraft and artillery served as the prelude for the 
entry of mechanized and armored forces into the area. These forces then proceeded to 
conduct a "scorched earth" campaign by destroying the local dwellings, food supplies, 
crops in the field, irrigation systems, livestock and wells. One Swedish official, after 
visiting several villages destroyed by the Soviets noted, "Russian soldiers shot at 
anything alive in six villages -- people, hens, donkeys - and then they plundered what 
remained of value."16 These Soviet operations aimed at driving the villagers out of these 
areas in an effort to create a cordon sanitaire in which the insurgents would find no 
support.  
Soviet efforts to create a barrier aimed at cutting-off the insurgents' logistic lifeline also 
extended to the employment of chemical agents. Already in 1980, there was considerable 
circumstantial evidence to support mujahideen claims of Soviet chemical weapons 
employment. US satellite imagery identified Soviet TMS-65 decontamination vehicles 
and AGV-3 detox chambers in the vicinity of combat areas. The eyewitness account of a 
Dutch journalist, who filmed Mi-24 Hind helicopters in two attacks dropping canisters 
that released a yellow cloud that killed at least one person, offered additional evidence of 
chemical use. In a public report of 22 March 1982, the US State Department accused the 
Soviets of using phosgene, nerve agents and other incapacitants in Afghanistan.17 The 
report stated:  
For the period from the summer of 1979 to the summer of 1981, the US Government 
received claims of 47 separate chemical attacks with a claimed death toll of more than 
3,000. . . . The reports indicated that fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters usually were 
employed to disseminate chemical warfare agents by rockets, bombs, and sprays. 
Chemical-filled land mines were also reportedly used by the Soviets. The chemical 
clouds were usually gray or blue-black, yellow, or a combination of the colors.18
In fairness to the Soviets, several investigators questioned the conclusions of the State 
Department report with respect to the use of chemical agents in Southeast Asia; however, 
the use of chemical agents in Afghanistan received independent verification as in the case 
cited above.  
The Soviet use of chemical agents in Afghanistan should not have been a surprise. The 
Soviets had invested heavily in chemical munitions.19 In fact, Soviet doctrine called for 
the use of chemical agents in both offensive and defensive roles. In short, chemical 
operations were part and parcel of standard Soviet doctrine for conventional operations. 
Chemical weapons employment in the battle against the mujahideen not only followed 
from Soviet doctrine, but also provided the military with an opportunity to test these 
agents in actual combined arms operations on a scale not previously possible. In addition, 
figure 1 shows the distribution of Soviet chemical attacks in Afghanistan. The map 
indicates the concentration of these areas along the eastern border with Pakistan as well 
as near the insurgent hotbed of Herat. The majority of attacks occurred in the spring and 
summer of 1980 and 1981 at the high seasons of mujahideen manpower and supply 
infiltration into the country.20 The pattern of chemical weapons employment clearly 
indicates an effort to interdict these movements.  
Village "pacification" and the creation of chemically contaminated "dead zones" were but 
two tools in the campaign aimed at the destruction of the insurgents' supply 
infrastructure. The Soviets also extensively employed air delivered mines in a further 
attempt to interdict the major caravan routes along the border. The use of mines became 
routine among Soviet forces in Afghanistan, both as a method for interdicting mujahideen 
supply routes and for protecting their bases and large urban areas such as Kabul.21 Soviet 
Major General Oleg Sarin and Colonel Lev Dvoretsky estimate that between 1980 and 
1985, Soviet engineers laid 91,000 anti-personnel mines. Helicopters alone dropped over 
a million mines, and, in 1983 and 1984, aircraft using the Vilyui system laid an additional 
1.7 million mines.22 Mines served two purposes. On the one hand, the Soviets used them 
to maim or disable mujahideen who would then require the help of their comrades to 
reach an aid station thus decreasing the size of the operational insurgent force in the field 
at any given time. On the other hand, mines laid along the resupply routes crippled mules 
and camels thereby decreasing the volume of provisions flowing to the resistance.23  
By the end of 1980, the Soviet and DRA forces only could lay claim to controlling an 
estimated 25 percent of Afghanistan, despite the extensive employment of almost all the 
weapons in the Soviet conventional arsenal.24 The emphasis on the use of conventional 
mechanized and armored forces in conjunction with massive artillery and airpower 
support allowed Soviet forces to physically occupy terrain, but not to maintain control of 
it after their withdrawal. The mujahideen refused to fight the Russians in fixed battles, 
and instead followed Mao's dictum: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, 
we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue."25 Despite an 
overwhelming preponderance of firepower and complete air supremacy, the Soviets 
could not eliminate the threat posed by a small, fractionalized and poorly armed 
insurgency. The limited number of ground combat forces and the nature of the problems 
they experienced made airpower all the more essential as an instrument for achieving 
Soviet military objectives. These objectives focused on the defeat of the mujahideen and 
the "pacification" of the Afghan population.  
The Soviets' reluctance to change their emphasis on the use of massed conventional 
mechanized and armored sweeps continued throughout 1981 despite the limited 
effectiveness of these operations. The unwillingness of Soviet troops to dismount from 
their vehicles increased their vulnerability to ambush and practically eliminated their 
ability to conduct pursuit operations. The Soviet aversion to dismounted operations 
reflected a desire by these forces to avoid close combat in favor of a reliance on air and 
artillery strikes.26 Anthony Arnold, an American intelligence analyst, argued that Soviet 
forces were slow to adapt to the nature of unconventional operations in Afghanistan. He 
noted, "The original armored sweep evolved into a hammer-and-anvil type of operation, 
intended to crush resistance forces between the advancing armor and a blocking force 
deployed ahead of it; so slow, cumbersome, and unimaginative were these attacks that the 
resistance could either avoid contact or exploit the situation operationally."27 In addition 
to doctrinal inflexibility, the severity of the Afghan winters further complicated major 
military operations and limited the campaigning season for ground forces.28  
By the end of 1981, it was becoming apparent that the use of large mechanized and armor 
forces did not constitute a strategy for victory. As a result of the poor results in 
combating the mujahideen, General Ivan Pavlovski was relieved of his command of the 
40th Army in December 1981 and returned to the Soviet Union.29 During this period, 
airpower began to play an increasing role as a "force substitute" in Soviet efforts to 
eliminate the mujahideen insurgency while minimizing their own casualties. At the 
beginning of 1981, the VVS air order of battle included approximately 130 jet fighters, 
predominantly MiG-21 Fishbeds, MiG-23 Floggers, and Su-17 Fitters among a total of 
300 fighter aircraft and transports.30 In addition, the Soviets maintained a force of about 
600 helicopters in Afghanistan. Helicopters, including Mi-6 Hook and Mi-8 Hip 
transports and, especially, Mi-24 Hind gunships proved invaluable to the Soviet strategy, 
and became the single most significant weapon in the Russian arsenal. The diverse range 
of helicopter missions in Afghanistan included close air support, forward air control 
spotting for fixed-wing aircraft and artillery, troop transport and resupply, medevac, 
chemical weapons delivery and reconnaissance.31 The importance of attack and transport 
helicopters in combating the insurgency cannot be overstated. Former Afghan General 
Mohammed Y. Nawroz and American intelligence analyst Lester W. Grau argued that 
"Without the helicopter gunship, the Soviets may have withdrawn years earlier. Its 
firepower and mobility and initial invulnerability put the guerrillas on the defensive. The 
Soviets used helicopters extensively and ruthlessly against the unprotected guerrillas."32  
In the rugged mountains of Afghanistan and along the border caravan routes, the Mi-24 
Hind essentially became a "flying tank," capable of providing massive firepower in 
support of ground operations or acting as a lethal instrument for aerial interdiction. 
During the first three years of the occupation, helicopters conducted regular patrols along 
the caravan routes in the hope of spotting mujahideen supply movements.33 The 1,400-
mile border between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the mountainous nature of the terrain 
made caravan detection from the air an extremely difficult task. In addition, the 
mujahideen, upon hearing the approach of a helicopter, would fall to the ground and 
cover themselves with their patou (earth-colored cloaks). This tactic was both low tech 
and astoundingly effective in making the insurgents invisible from the air. Kurt Lohbeck, 
a journalist who traveled extensively with the mujahideen, described his own experience 
as Soviet helicopters twice flew over his group's position at an altitude of only one 
hundred feet without detecting them. Lohbeck states that "a man standing still or 
squatting just ten yards away was nearly invisible."34 Indeed, invisibility was a necessary 
virtue as evidenced by Soviet General Boris Gromov's, commander of the 40th Army, 
remark that upon locating a caravan if people ran they were shot.35 Mike Martin, a 
British journalist who traveled with the mujahideen, noted that the insurgents, lacking the 
weapons with which to combat the heavily armed Mi-24 Hind effectively, "feared them 
more than anything else."36 The armored Mi-24 was indeed a formidable weapons 
system with its 12.7-mm machine gun, guided missiles and 128 57-mm rockets. Despite 
this lethal array of armaments, however, the pilot still had to find his target in the 
mountains or high plains of Afghanistan in order to be effective.  
Despite the extensive employment of helicopter assets, Soviet operations in 1981 proved 
disappointing. In July, Soviet forces launched an inconclusive attack into the Sarobi 
valley employing air strikes and air-landed troops.37 In September, mujahideen attacks 
forced Soviet and DRA forces to withdraw from positions in the Panjshir valley and north 
of Kabul. In the provincial capital of Kandahar, Soviet aircraft conducted strikes against a 
section of the city in a successful attempt to dislodge mujahideen forces.38 The bombing 
of urban centers provided a short, albeit brutal, respite against mujahideen operations 
within the major Afghan cities. In one example, the Soviets achieved a limited tactical 
victory by killing a reported 600 mujahideen in a battle to retake the city of Herat in 
October.39 During renewed fighting in the cities of Herat and Kandahar in January and 
February 1982, the Soviets again displayed an apparent willingness to employ both 
airpower and artillery in urban centers despite the risk of high collateral casualties. US 
Deputy Secretary of State Walter Stoessel testified that, "Soviet troops surrounded 
Afghanistan's second largest city, Kandahar, and subjected it to a savage artillery and air 
bombardment in which hundreds of innocent civilians lost their lives." In addition, he 
remarked that a rebellion in Herat, Afghanistan's fourth largest city, was crushed "with 
similar ruthlessness, causing great suffering among its population."40 In the end, Soviet 
operations in Herat and Kandahar were qualified successes. The use of indiscriminate 
terror within Afghanistan's urban centers illustrated the intrinsic bankruptcy of Soviet 
strategy, as the identity and affiliation of those killed became less important than the total 
"body count." However, striking at major urban centers in the hope of killing some 
mujahideen with the certainty of killing many noncombatants presents an unambiguous 
example of punitive coercion in its purest form. The policy of targeting urban centers was 
also politically counterproductive, as the majority of support for the DRA came from 
various ethnic groups within the urban minorities.41  
The VVS operations against Afghan urban centers offer a clear lesson as to the limited 
utility of airpower when faced with large groups of insurgents operating in close 
proximity to, or among, the civilian population. In densely populated city centers, 
operational planners face a formidable challenge. Separating the insurgents from the 
noncombatants requires first-rate intelligence, precision-guided munitions and discrete 
payloads. In fact, all three of these elements must come together within a limited time 
horizon. Real time intelligence offers a targeting window while PGMs and discrete 
payloads can help lessen, but not completely eliminate, collateral damage among the 
civilian population. Although the Soviet use of an airpower sledgehammer more closely 
reflected the iron bomb attacks of 1945 versus the microchip technology of 1999, the 
recent campaign in the Balkans once again demonstrated that the difficulties and dangers 
inherent in striking urban targets remain very real.  
By 1982, the Afghan civilian population whether in the insurgent controlled countryside 
or within the Soviet and DRA occupied cities, now constituted an open target for massed 
firepower. Airpower also played a substantial role in striking at the insurgents directly. A 
combined arms operation into the Panjshir valley in the spring included the commitment 
of 12,000 Soviet and DRA troops and more than 200 sorties by fixed-wing aircraft and 
helicopters.42 The objective of the joint Soviet and DRA thrust centered on destroying 
the 3,000-man force of Ahmad Shah Massud, thereby securing the northern approach to 
the Kabul-Termez highway. The initial stages of the offensive into the Panjshir valley 
relied heavily on airpower. The Soviets also demonstrated increasing ingenuity in the use 
of their aviation assets. The offensive began on 10 May with converted An-12 Cub 
transports serving as aerial reconnaissance and target designation platforms. In addition, 
the Su-25 Frogfoot ground attack aircraft made its debut in the theater, and proved 
effective in the close air support role. Prior to the commitment of ground forces, Soviet 
jets conducted a week-long bombing of suspected insurgent positions using conventional 
high explosive loads. On 17 May, a large-scale heliborne insertion of the 103rd Air 
Assault Division began. In support of the 103rd, the 108th Motor Rifle Division began 
pushing up the valley in a classic hammer-and-anvil maneuver. Soviet and DRA forces 
soon ran into trouble as land mines and insurgent ambushes from tributary valleys 
inflicted heavy losses and destroyed at least six BTR-60 armored personnel carriers 
(APCs) and at least six T-62 tanks.43  
The mechanized forces, unable to maneuver or elevate their guns to fire at the 
surrounding heights, requested close air support. Groups of six Mi-24s arrived at the 
requested points and loitered overhead in the so-called "circle of death." Forward air 
controllers with the ground units vectored the helicopters onto suspected mujahideen 
positions that were then attacked with cannon fire and rockets. Despite their success 
against the mechanized forces, the exposed mujahideen forces had little chance against 
Soviet airpower, and they were forced to withdraw back into the tributary valleys. The 
offensive did eventually succeed in reestablishing DRA control over the floor of the 
Panjshir valley, for the first time since 1978, at the cost of between 300 and 400 Soviet 
casualties. However, the campaign was only a partial success, as the besieged mujahideen 
simply disappeared into the surrounding hills to await the inevitable Soviet withdrawal. 
After a few weeks the Soviet forces did leave, making the victory decidedly pyrrhic for 
the Russians and their DRA allies. However, still hoping for a set-piece battle, the 
Soviets repeated the offensive into Panjshir in late August with the same result. In this 
offensive, the Soviets lost approximately 300 men in occupying the valley floor, and 
again withdrew after several weeks, leaving the valley once more in the hands of the 
mujahideen.44  
The Panjshir valley campaigns of the spring and summer of 1982 illustrated the essential 
nature of Soviet strategy, writ small. The Panjshir offensives highlighted the Soviet 
emphasis on using airpower in a number of roles including aerial fire direction, 
observation, troop transport, and close air support (CAS) in support of the combined arms 
offensive. The weeklong aerial bombardment prior to the start of the ground offensive 
demonstrated a "Somme-like" reliance on intensive bombardment in preparation for the 
attack. The campaigns also illustrated the importance of helicopters in combined arms 
operations. On the one hand, rotary-wing aircraft provided the key platform for rapidly 
delivering air assault troops to their blocking positions. The use of blokirovkas (blocking 
maneuvers) usually involved a coordinated thrust between mechanized forces pushing 
toward the objective with a helicopter insertion of VDV (airborne) or DShB (air assault) 
troops behind the objective in order to prevent the escape of encircled enemy forces.45 
On the other hand, the reliance on the Mi-24 Hind for CAS also indicated its 
effectiveness in this role. The low threat environment experienced by the helicopters was 
evident in the Soviet tactic of establishing a high orbit over the target area. Indeed, the 
lack of effective anti-aircraft defenses was a glaring weakness among the insurgents in 
1982. In contrast, the mujahideen success against personnel carriers and tanks highlighted 
the vulnerability of mechanized forces in mountainous terrain. Finally, operations in 
Afghanistan illustrated the importance of having forward air controllers to direct CAS.46  
In the final analysis, the offensives into Panjshir failed despite the Soviets' ability to 
organize their forces into a powerful combined arms team. Soviet commanders were 
learning a bitter and frustrating lesson, much as their American counterparts had 15 years 
earlier in Vietnam. This lesson was that insurgents, based on their tactics and their use of 
terrain, might prove relatively invulnerable to conventional operations even when these 
operations were supported by massive firepower. In an unconventional warfare 
environment "owning the air" offers a number of very real advantages; however, the 
American experience in Vietnam and the Soviet experience in Afghanistan showed that 
control of the air might be a necessary, but certainly not a sufficient, condition for 
victory.  
By August 1982, the Soviet and DRA forces still controlled only the country's main cities 
and major roads.47 By the end of the year, Soviet frustration with the situation in 
Afghanistan was apparent as well. The death of Leonid Brezhnev in November and his 
replacement by Yuri Andropov did little to change the tactical or strategic situation for 
members of the 40th Army. Soviet Politburo minutes indicate that Andropov's "model for 
the war against the Afghan mujaheddin [sic] was the brutal campaign to establish Soviet 
rule in Central Asia following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution." Andropov's guidance 
provided a renewed impetus for a strategy of terror and reprisal against the Afghan 
population. The Soviets revealed the nature of this strategy in an attack on the city of 
Pagman in September. According to Western diplomats, Soviet jets and helicopters 
bombed and strafed the main marketplace for over two hours, killing and wounding 
several dozen people.48 Soviet forces, unable to corner the insurgents, increasingly 
resorted to reprisals in order to punish the civilian population for mujahideen actions. In 
April 1983, the Soviets responded to a general uprising in the ever-volatile hot bed of 
Herat by conducting an indiscriminate "carpet bombing" campaign against the city of 
150,000. The campaign, described by US officials as "extremely heavy, brutal, and 
prolonged," resulted in the destruction of half the city and the deaths of an estimated 
3,000 noncombatants.49 In addition, Soviet and DRA forces began a reprisal policy of 
targeting villages in the vicinity of mujahideen attacks against convoys or outposts.  
Mike Martin discussed the Russian policy of targeting nearby villages in retaliation for 
insurgent attacks by stating that the Soviets were "reduced to deliberately killing civilians 
in the vain hope they would abandon their fighting men."50 Soviet and DRA aircraft or 
artillery bombarded the selected villages, and in some cases destroyed cultivated fields. 
The destruction of crops constituted a continuing element in an ongoing Soviet 
"starvation policy."51 Martin argued that "By the middle of 1983 the Russians seemed 
bankrupt of military ideas and had resorted to the widespread use of terror." Martin 
witnessed the use of jets for reprisal attacks on at least four occasions during his stay in 
Afghanistan. In one case, the Russians bombed a village for two weeks in retaliation for 
an attack on the outpost at Tagob. He described the Soviet attack as follows: "For days 
the jets flew low over the valley bombing the houses to dust. The worst destruction left 
you with a feeling that there had been no life there anyway: just mounds of rubble"52  
In almost every respect, Soviet air and ground operations underwent an increasing 
radicalization in the years between 1981 and 1983, with the significant exception, 
however, of evidence of chemical weapons employment in 1983.53 Soviet military 
planners increasingly employed airpower as both a "force substitute" and an instrument 
of terror and reprisal against Afghanistan's civilian population. The inability to fix the 
mujahideen, the desire to avoid casualties and the resulting Soviet frustration with the 
status quo combined in the adoption of a seemingly simple and effective method for 
lowering personnel losses. It soon became apparent, however, that a new strategy was 
needed.  
Air Assault Comes to Afghanistan  
In 1984, the Soviets began to modify their air and ground strategy in an effort to more 
effectively employ their assets against the insurgents. Stephen Blank described this shift 
in strategy and tactics as "moving in the direction of greater reliance upon mobility, long-
range ordnance from air power, vertical rather than tank-led encirclement, [and the] use 
of specially assigned forces."54 The Soviet lessons drawn from the first three years of the 
war involving the necessity for rapid mobility and massive, responsive fire support in 
essence constituted a restatement of traditional Soviet doctrinal precepts. The focus on 
"vertical envelopment," however, established a new emphasis for Soviet operations 
involving the massed use of heliborne operations by specially trained airborne and air 
assault forces.  
Soviet airborne operations involving actual parachute drops were relatively rare in 
Afghanistan. Still, airborne forces (VDV) had proved vital in conducting operations to 
secure key installations throughout the country during the initial invasion. As the war 
progressed, VDV forces pioneered many of the Soviet irregular warfare tactics, and, in 
turn, these forces became a primary element for conducting counterinsurgency operations 
either as dismounted infantry or by helicopter insertion.55 The following eyewitness 
account by a former mujahid aptly described the special capabilities of VDV forces in 
unconventional warfare:  
We had taken positions close to the top of a mountain overlooking a valley and were 
shooting at the Soviets with BM-12s [rockets] and mortars. . . . Then all of a sudden a 
VDV company of about 90 men appeared and attacked us from behind. They had 
climbed straight up the mountain during the night. . . . We fought for two days there, and 
many people were killed. Before that I had thought that the Soviet soldiers are not worth 
anything . . . These were really tough guys.56
This story not only illustrates the capabilities of the VDV, but it also points to a shift in 
Soviet strategy toward night operations during this period. As late as November 1982, 
one senior Soviet military leader, Guards Major General F. Kuz'min, had criticized the 
performance of Soviet forces in night operations.57 Soviet planners responded to the 
need for a more effective night fighting capability, and by 1984 VDV (airborne), DShB 
(air assault), and specially trained reconnaissance troops constituted the primary forces 
for conducting night attacks and ambushes.58 Still, the lack of an effective night-capable 
aircraft restricted support to these ambushes and limited other aerial operations during the 
hours of darkness.  
By 1984, helicopters, and the mobility they provided, began to play a much-expanded 
role in the war against the insurgents. Both VDV and DShB forces counted on helicopters 
to provide them with increased mobility and firepower support in contrast to the 
vulnerable and slow-moving mechanized convoys. One veteran of the desant forces, 
Vladislav Tamarov, stated "It was a lot easier on us when the helicopters took us into the 
mountains: you went to the airfield, boarded the copter, and in an hour you were there." 
Desant forces conducted four major types of military actions in Afghanistan, including: 
large-scale operations using artillery and aviation support to destroy concentrated pockets 
of mujahideen; small-scale operations by regiments with artillery and aviation support 
aimed at destroying a specific group of mujahideen; the "combing" of villages to identify 
weapons stores and field hospitals; and company-sized ambushes near roads, major trails 
or villages. Tamarov remarked that the Soviet counterinsurgency forces relied heavily on 
dismounted operations in contrast to their motorized rifle counterparts. His description of 
Soviet operations also illustrated the desant forces' reliance on air support as well as the 
routine use of these forces in counterinsurgency roles. In fact, DShB forces began to 
conduct surprise heliborne attacks against both villages and suspected mujahideen way 
stations (chaikhana, literally "tea house"). In one example, two helicopters landed 
approximately two dozen troops at a chaikhana. They surprised and, in about ten 
minutes, killed 30 insurgents before departing by helicopter.59  
An operation in October 1984 in the area of the Pizgoran ravine demonstrated the 
increasing Soviet reliance on large-scale air landings involving motorized rifle and 
counterinsurgency forces. On 25 October, 24 Mi-8 Hip helicopters airlifted 1,280 men 
into the area. During the operation, Mi-24 Hinds, MiG-23 Floggers, and Su-25s provided 
fire support for the landing force. Sarin and Dvoretsky stated that this type of operation 
allowed Soviet forces to inflict losses on insurgents holding defensive positions while 
projecting "concentrated fire at distant operational locations beyond the front line."60 
Main force units subsequently accomplished a link-up with the airhead forces in this 
operation prior to a further advance against the insurgent positions. In this instance, the 
air assault landing had essentially acted as the force with which first to outflank, and then 
to crack the mujahideen defensive line.  
The relative success of this new combined arms strategy employing air assault techniques 
led to a growing optimism among the Soviet leadership concerning their ability to 
eventually defeat the insurgency. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail S. Kapitsa 
stated in 1986 that the war would be over in five years.61 Kapitsa's assertion proved 
prophetic, but not in the intended sense of a Soviet victory. Prior to 1984, Soviet control 
of the skies was largely uncontested. The mujahideen lacked the armaments with which 
to construct an effective air defense system, and achieved their greatest successes against 
Soviet air units in mortar and rocket attacks against their airfields. However, this situation 
began to change as the insurgents acquired a greater number of heavy machine guns and 
manportable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).  
Prior to 1986, the mujahideen's most effective anti-aircraft weapon proved to be the 
"Dashka" 12.7 mm and the "Zigriat" 14.5 mm heavy machine-guns. A Soviet defector, 
Alexander Zuyev, noted that the mujahideen air defense tactics were "relatively 
primitive" in 1984, "[but] their 12.7 mm and 14.5 mm antiaircraft guns could be 
dangerous below an altitude of about 4,500 feet."62 These heavy machine-guns began 
arriving in greater numbers as a result of increasing Chinese deliveries. For example, 
there were only 13 mujahideen heavy machine-guns in the Panjshir Valley in 1982, but, 
by the end of 1984, there were almost 250.63 The mujahideen became quite proficient in 
the use of these weapons to conduct "lateral ambushes." They situated gun sites at 
positions along opposing ridgelines in order to provide enfilade fire of Soviet aircraft 
operating in the area below the ridge or along the valley floor.64 A chagrined Soviet 
veteran described his unit's capture of several "Dashka" heavy machine-guns which had 
found their way from the Soviet Union to China, and on to Afghanistan, where they were 
now being used to kill Russian soldiers.65  
Mujahideen air defense initiatives were not only confined to the battlefield. In fact, the 
insurgents achieved some dramatic results by infiltrating areas in the vicinity of Soviet 
airfields in order to attack Russian aircraft. Military Transport Aviation (VTA) continued 
to play a key role in resupplying Russian forces in Afghanistan.66 According to one 
analyst, from the early stages of the war the Soviets relied "heavily on the VTA for the 
routine introduction of military materiel ordinarily transported by road. . . . [and] 
helicopters were being used extensively to move supplies within the country."67 
However, the VTA was not able to escape the effects associated with the mujahideen's 
increased number of SA-7s. On 28 October 1984, the insurgents shot down a Soviet An-
22 Cock heavy transport using a SA-7 as it took off from the Kabul airport. In another 
example, an Afghan Airline DC-10 with 300 passengers aboard was hit by a SA-7, but 
managed to land safely.68 Surrounded by a series of low hills, the airport at Kabul 
remained particularly vulnerable to the SAM threat throughout the remainder of the war. 
Kabul was not the only airfield put at risk by the mujahideen's manportable SAMs. In 
September 1984, the insurgents shot down a Bakhtar Airlines aircraft with a SA-7 just 
after it took off from the Kandahar airfield.69 The Soviets countered the growing SAM 
threat with on-board decoy flare systems as well as helicopter flare ships orbiting the 
airport prior to take-offs and landings.70 The increasing SAM threat throughout the 
theater resulted in the redeployment of Soviet electronic intelligence (ELINT) aircraft 
and long-range bombers based at Shindand back to the Soviet Union.71 Bases inside the 
Soviet Union, such as Termez, provided greater security for these assets, and still allowed 
for their effective employment within Afghanistan.  
The acquisition of SA-7s allowed the mujahideen to achieve limited success in blunting 
the Soviet aerial advantage. The impact of the weapon should not be measured in the 
numbers of aircraft shot down alone. The missiles forced Soviet and DRA aircraft and 
helicopters to adjust their mission profiles and tactical procedures. The introduction of 
the SA-7 not only increased the threat experienced by the aircrews, but it also 
demonstrated the disproportionate impact that can occur when insurgencies obtain 
modest technological upgrades to their weapons arsenals. In the unconventional warfare 
environment, insurgents do not need to control the air, but only to dictate the way in 
which airpower can be employed by a technologically advanced adversary.  
By the end of 1984, Soviet airpower, in all its various forms, carried the lion's share of 
the burden in prosecuting the war against the mujahideen. Operations ranged from the use 
of 36 Tu-16 Badger bombers in a mini "ARC LIGHT"72 campaign against the Panjshir 
Valley in April 1984 to the employment of VTA An-12 Cubs and An-26 Curls as master 
bombers.73 Transport aircraft acting as flare ships for battlefield illumination also played 
an important role in discouraging or combating mujahideen night attacks.74 In addition, 
the use of helicopters in support of air assault, CAS and interdiction operations formed a 
crucial element in the Soviet air strategy to defeat the insurgents. Stephen Blank correctly 
argued that "Between 1980 and 1986 Soviet strategy in Afghanistan gradually came to 
rely almost exclusively on airpower, staking everything on airpower's capabilities to 
deliver ordnance, interdict supplies and reserves, isolate the battlefield from the rear, 
destroy the agricultural basis . . . and rapidly move troops from point to point."75  
By 1985, barring a massive influx of Soviet forces, it was clear that Soviet airpower 
would have to play an even greater role in order to win the battle against the mujahideen. 
The relatively small size of the Soviet contingent, estimated at 115,000 troops by early 
1985, precluded a ground solution to the campaign.76 By the end of the year, Soviet 
strategy mirrored the proverb "live by the sword, die by the sword." A survey in 1985 by 
Swedish relief workers illustrated the continued willingness of the Russians to employ 
the sword of airpower as a punitive weapon. The survey indicated that the fields of over 
half the farmers who remained in Afghanistan were bombed, and over a quarter of these 
same farmers had their irrigation systems destroyed and livestock shot by Soviet and 
DRA forces.77 The Soviets were in fact living to a great degree by the airpower sword, 
but the mujahideen were becoming increasingly adept at blunting the blows of the Soviet 
aerial cutlass.  
By the beginning of 1986, the mujahideen had clearly demonstrated an increased ability 
to combat Soviet airpower, and had forced Russian jets to operate at higher altitudes 
thereby decreasing their accuracy. The greater number of heavy machine-guns among the 
insurgents also led to an increasing capability to threaten the mainstay of Soviet aviation 
in Afghanistan, their helicopters. The Mi-24 Hind, almost impervious to small arms fire, 
was vulnerable to concentrated fire from both heavy machine-guns and the SA-7. In the 
end, the numbers tell the story. One Afghan defector estimated DRA aircraft losses 
between December 1979 and early 1984 at 164 aircraft (both fixed-wing and 
helicopter).78 Joseph J. Collins, a former US army officer, estimated that by the end of 
1984 Soviet losses totaled 600 aircraft.79 The balance of power began to shift in favor of 
the insurgents as the mujahideen achieved their first successes in contesting Soviet 
dominance of the skies over Afghanistan in 1984 and 1985.  
Mujahideen Ascendant  
The offensives of 1984 and 1985 had proved costly to Soviet forces in Afghanistan. 
Western intelligence reports estimated that 2,343 Soviet personnel were killed in action 
(KIA) in 1984 and another 1,868 KIA in 1985.80 The ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev to 
the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 
the spring of 1985 coincided with what would become the third costliest year of the war 
for the Soviets.81 Soviet frustration with the war was becoming increasingly apparent. 
From the platform of the 27th Party Congress in February 1986, Gorbachev described 
Afghanistan as a "bloody stump."82 In addition to the cost in lives, the Soviet Union was 
spending an estimated 5 billion dollars a year in prosecuting the war.83 In fact, 1986 was 
destined to be the year of decision for Soviet policy makers concerning their continued 
involvement in the Afghan quagmire.  
British defense correspondent Mark Urban stated that "From early 1986 the Soviet Army 
switched to a more defensive strategy. Rural operations were reduced and defences 
around towns increased . . ." Urban estimated that there were six offensives involving 
more than 5,000 Soviet troops each in 1984-85 while there was only one such operation 
during the last three years of the war.84 Urban's argument is correct with respect to the 
involvement of Soviet ground forces, as the burden of large-scale ground fighting began 
to shift to DRA forces. In fact, Soviet casualties in 1986 dropped to their lowest levels 
since 1981. The Soviets did not, however, completely abandon offensive operations. In 
February 1986, Soviet forces conducted a large-scale operation into the Charikar valley, 
approximately 40 miles north of Kabul, which demonstrated the increasing proficiency of 
Soviet forces in the conduct of desant-type combined arms operations. For example, on 
the first day alone, helicopters conducted a tactical insertion of three airborne battalions 
and three motor rifle companies. Later, an additional 17 battalions were landed in support 
of the operation.85 The Charikar valley operation illustrated the increased proficiency 
achieved by Soviet forces in massed air assault operations by 1986.  
In early April, Soviet and DRA forces launched a joint operation aimed at capturing the 
major mujahideen stronghold at Zhawar, a mere three kilometers from the Pakistani 
border. The attacking force consisted of 12,000 troops of which only 2,200 were Soviet. 
Soviet airpower played a critical role in assembling forces for the attack by airlifting 
4,200 DRA and Russian troops into the airport at Khost just prior to the start of the 
operation. During the initial stages of the operation, DRA mechanized and ground forces 
pushing south from Khost encountered heavy resistance that slowed their advance to 
between two and three kilometers per day. In attempting to break the mujahideen 
resistance, the offensive on the road to Zhawar relied heavily on large-scale heliborne 
operations in order to provide the anvil for the hammer of the advancing mechanized 
forces. Brigadier Abdol Gafur, the DRA commander for the operation, employed elite 
Soviet and DRA battalions in air assault landings behind the mujahideen lines. Soviet 
aircraft also supported the DRA forces by conducting strikes on mujahideen positions. 
For example, Soviet Su-25 Frogfoot ground attack aircraft with laser-guided bombs 
successfully struck the insurgents' cave/storage complex at Zhawar.86 After almost three 
weeks of fighting, Zhawar fell to the DRA and Soviet forces. Although modest in terms 
of Soviet ground participation, the campaign clearly indicated the continuing importance 
of Soviet airpower in all its forms. The Zhawar campaign provided an example of Soviet 
airpower's effectiveness when the mujahideen chose to stand and fight a fixed battle.  
During this period, the Soviets also adapted their tactics to better suit the nature of 
unconventional warfare by employing small groups of specially trained commando forces 
(spetsnaz) to conduct hit-and-run raids against the mujahideen. Edward Girardet, a 
journalist with extensive experience traveling with the mujahideen, stated "The special 
troops are swift, silent and deadly. Swooping down in a single December [1985] raid, 
they slaughtered 82 guerrillas and wounded 60 more."87 A mujahideen commander, 
Amin Wardak described the ambush: "They attacked at night in a narrow gorge. At first, 
we didn't know we were being shot at because of the silencers. Then our people began 
falling."88 These ambushes were effective, but relied on small numbers of specially 
trained forces. In addition, these forces relied largely on the mobility provided by 
helicopters for insertion and exfiltration.89 Still, these isolated successes could not break 
the mujahideen's hold on the countryside.  
If Soviet ground operations were reduced in 1986, the nature of Soviet air operations 
remained essentially the same. One estimate of Soviet aircraft in Afghanistan in 1986 
included 80 MiG-21 Fishbeds, 40 MiG-23 Floggers, 80 Su-17 Fitters, 30 Su-25s, and 27 
reconnaissance aircraft.90 However, the number of helicopters in the country 
dramatically declined between 1985 and 1988. Compared to a high of approximately 600 
aircraft in 1982, the number of helicopters fell from 350 in 1985 to 325 in 1986, and, 
finally to 275 by February 1988.91 The greatly reduced number of helicopters was in part 
tied to the restricted size and nature of Soviet ground operations. More importantly, the 
growing vulnerability of rotary-wing assets to the increasing missile threat undoubtedly 
played a role in the decision to reduce these forces.  
After a period of prolonged deliberation, the US government decided to supply the 
mujahideen with heat-seeking Stinger surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in 1986. In 
hindsight, it is clear that both the psychological and physical impact of the Stinger proved 
enormous. The very presence of the missile, whether used to full effect or not, forced a 
fundamental alteration in the nature of Soviet air tactics throughout Afghanistan. The 
Stinger, however, constituted the second phase in attempts by the West to improve the 
organic air defense capabilities of the insurgents. Already in the beginning of 1986, the 
mujahideen received the first shipments of the British- manufactured Blowpipe 
manportable SAM.92 The optically guided Blowpipe proved large and unwieldy in the 
eyes of the insurgents. The Blowpipe required the operator to guide the missile with a 
thumb-controlled joystick while tracking the target with a monocular sight.93 Paul 
Overby, an American who traveled with the mujahideen in 1988, described the reaction 
of one insurgent when comparing the fire-and-forget Stinger with the Blowpipe: "Gulaly 
asked me if the Stinger was American. I told him it was. 'Stinger . . . klak! Blowpipe . . . 
kherab!' Stinger tough, Blowpipe bad, he repeated over and over, like an incantation."94 
It is important to note that klak, or toughness, was a trait valued by the mujahideen and 
indicated admiration for the weapon, and not the fact that it was difficult to use. In fact, 
the Stinger was not a user-friendly missile. The most difficult step in firing the missile 
involved its complicated IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) process.95 However, the 
Afghan insurgents had no need for this step. The elimination of IFF did not make Stinger 
a "point and shoot weapon," but it did greatly facilitate its use by the mujahideen. In any 
event, the Stinger was by all indications a great improvement over the Blowpipe. Daoud 
Rams, a former MiG-21 pilot with the Afghan air force, stated that "The Blowpipe 
missile didn't present as serious a problem to fighter aircraft as Stinger. Both Stinger and 
Blowpipe were real problems for helicopters, but we were more concerned with 
Stinger."96 The Blowpipe did not prove the answer to the insurgents' prayers, but the 
introduction of the Stinger in mid-1986 fundamentally weakened a major Soviet 
advantage -- the ability to exert coercive force through aerial attacks.  
By October 1986, the mujahideen had received approximately 200 Stinger missiles.97 
The Stinger, with its maximum speed of 2.2 Mach and maximum effective range of 5.5 
kilometers, provided a quantum leap in performance over the SA-7 with a maximum 
speed of 1.4 Mach and maximum effective range of 3 kilometers.98 More importantly, 
the Stinger was an all-aspect missile while the infrared passive homing SA-7 could only 
be launched from the rear quadrant of aircraft moving away from the missile operator. 
The physical impact of Stinger found expression in a variety of ways. For example, a 
Soviet doctor discussed the missile's impact, stating "Until 1987 all of the wounded were 
evacuated by helicopter . . . But the arrival of Stinger missiles put an end to the massive 
use of choppers."99 Not only were medevac missions affected, but also the essential 
nature of air tactics changed with the arrival of the Stinger. Daoud Rams remarked that 
"Before Stinger, we were free to do almost anything we wanted. After Stinger was 
introduced, we changed all our tactics, altitudes and speed -- everything. We did not like 
to fly down low, and when we had to, we flew very fast, and even at high altitudes, we 
flew as fast as we could . . .. We were no longer able to operate at will whenever and 
wherever we wanted to."100 Sarin and Dvoretsky supported this view with their 
statement that the Stingers "inflicted heavy losses on Soviet pilots." They also observed 
that "the combat effectiveness of Soviet air operations was lessened greatly when the 
Stinger was introduced into Afghanistan."101  
Without a doubt, the Stinger forced a change in flight profiles for both fixed-wing and 
helicopter aircraft. Driving helicopters and attack aircraft down to the deck now exposed 
them to increased danger from small arms fire even in areas where the Stinger was not 
deployed. The psychological impact of the Stinger was almost as profound as the 
physical results achieved by the missile. By the end of 1986, both Soviet and DRA pilots 
had to assume that the missile was operational throughout the entire country. One 
member of the mujahideen succinctly described the behavior change among attacking 
pilots in the following words: "They don't like suffering casualties, so they drop their 
bombs and fly home as quickly as they can." John Gunston, a former British army officer 
and journalist for Aviation Week & Space Technology, after observing a six-ship Soviet 
jet strike in the beginning of 1988, remarked on the poor results of the bombing. "It 
appeared," he said "that the pilots involved were putting survival before accuracy."102  
The interdiction of supplies and manpower along the border had formed one of the 
cornerstones of Soviet strategy from the outset of the war. By 1986, the Soviets came 
increasingly to rely on airpower rather than ground forces to enforce a literal no man's 
land in the Afghan provinces bordering Pakistan. By the end of 1984, the majority of 
supply caravans moved at night in order to avoid the threat of Soviet air attack. In the 
period from November 1983 to March 1984, the Soviets used specially trained 
reconnaissance troops to monitor 13 points along the major infiltration routes from 
Pakistan. These forces detected 579 movements out of Pakistan of which 463, or, 80 
percent, were conducted at night. By the beginning of 1988, Gunston observed that "The 
fear of air attack that had prevailed among the mujahideen in 1985 and 1986 has 
disappeared and supply caravans now travel with ease during the day, something they 
were loathe to do two years ago."103 The introduction of the Stinger not only allowed 
supply caravans to travel during the day, but it also allowed mujahideen forces to mass in 
preparation for offensive operations.  
Anthony Tucker argued that "The introduction of Stinger ended the Soviets' ability to 
conduct heliborne operations and airborne operations with impunity. This over-reliance 
on helicopters meant they had no other options when it came to interdicting the 
insurgents' operations, making the war once and for all unwinable [sic], contributing to 
their decision to withdraw."104 An analysis of the chronology of Russian decision-
making only partially supports Tucker's argument. Gorbachev had already ordered a 
partial troop withdrawal in the summer of 1986. The decision to "get out" of Afghanistan, 
however, did not occur until a Politburo meeting of 13 November 1986. During this 
seminal meeting Gorbachev argued "We have been fighting in Afghanistan for six years 
now. If we don't change approaches we will be fighting for another 20 or 30 years . . .. 
We must finish this process in the swiftest time possible."105 In a tone distinctly 
reminiscent of American military leaders after Vietnam, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev 
stated:  
There is not a single piece of land [in Afghanistan] that the Soviet soldier has not 
conquered. Despite this, a large chunk of territory is in the hands of the rebels. We 
control Kabul and the provincial centers, but we have been unable to establish authority 
over the seized territory. We have lost the struggle for the Afghan people.106
The appearance of the Stinger, in addition to the increased number of SA-7s and 
Blowpipes, may have played some role in the Politburo's decision based on the missile's 
early success. It appears, however, that Gorbachev was reacting to a prolonged and costly 
struggle that offered the Soviets no real advantage besides the opportunity to increase the 
roll call of fraternal socialist states -- domestic political and economic considerations 
apparently outweighed protocol victories.  
By the end of 1986, a little over two years of fighting still remained. It was clear, 
however, that the center of gravity of Soviet operations in Afghanistan revolved around 
the ability of the VVS to quickly and accurately deliver both fire support and forces 
throughout the country.107 The introduction of the Stinger missile effectively reduced 
the Soviets' greatest advantage. The Soviets no longer "owned" the air, and, in turn, the 
loss of air supremacy essentially precluded any chance for a Russian victory in the near 
future.  
CONCLUSIONS  
At the outset of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, military and 
political pundits were nearly unanimous in their predictions of a rapid Soviet victory. 
Few believed that a fractionalized and ill-equipped insurgency could long stand against 
the armed might of one the greatest military powers in the world. However, the pundits 
were proven wrong, and the mujahideen did triumph. Afghanistan should serve as a 
caution to both US military strategists and to an American public inebriated by the 
overwhelming success of coalition arms in the Gulf War and the apparent NATO success 
in the Balkans. Today, the armed forces of the United States enjoy a position of 
preeminence among the world's militaries. Paradoxically, the current US position of 
military preeminence may be threatened less by budget cuts than by a changing paradigm 
in warfare. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan demonstrates the dangers inherent in 
equating conventional military strength with the capability to achieve victory in the 
environment of unconventional war.  
Former US ambassador Edwin Corr and American political scientist Stephen Sloan, in 
Low-Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World, present a convincing argument 
concerning the changing paradigm from conventional to irregular warfare.108 The post-
Cold War era has, indeed, initiated a period in which US political and military efforts 
must focus on the exigencies of low-intensity conflict. The Soviet experience in 
Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989 provides numerous insights and cautions for today's 
military planners, who contemplate the employment of force in "non-trinitarian" 
conflict.109 The Soviet failure clearly demonstrates the potential danger in relying on 
airpower as a primary instrument for coercion. The war in Afghanistan showed that air 
supremacy alone does not constitute a panacea for guaranteeing success in contemporary 
military operations. The Soviets' inability to achieve their political objectives in 
Afghanistan also illustrated the limits of conventional military power in the low-intensity 
environment. Despite an overwhelming advantage in firepower and complete mastery of 
the air, Soviet and DRA forces failed to coerce the mujahideen into ceasing their attacks 
against the Russian occupation forces and the DRA regime.  
Airpower as Force Substitute  
The conflict in Afghanistan witnessed a definitive shift in the standard Soviet 
employment of airpower in the conduct of military operations. Soviet doctrine in 1979 
emphasized the use of airpower as a force adjunct for the direct support of ground forces. 
This doctrinal disposition relied heavily on the historical legacy of the Soviet experience 
against the Germans in World War II. In the initial period of the Afghan war, Soviet 
airpower conformed to this existing paradigm of ground support operations. However, 
the unwillingness of DRA forces to fight, Moscow's reluctance to increase Soviet troop 
levels, and the desire to minimize casualties led to the employment of airpower as both a 
"force multiplier" and a "force substitute" in the battle against the mujahideen. The Soviet 
use of airpower as a force substitute extended to both attacks on the insurgents and their 
military infrastructure as well as strikes aimed at punishing the civilian population. 
Indeed, the employment of airpower as a punitive instrument found its most brutal 
expression in a deliberate VVS campaign of aerial terror. In the end, barring a massive 
additional commitment of Soviet ground forces, airpower constituted the single 
remaining viable option with which to combat the Muslim insurgency. Airpower clearly 
became the Soviet "force of choice" in Afghanistan.  
Assessing the Soviet Failure  
Soviet operations aimed at achieving coercion through punishment failed because of the 
following factors:  
(1) Punishment operations could not overcome the mujahideen determination to resist the 
Soviet occupation based on the insurgents' religious and nationalistic beliefs.  
(2) Punishment operations proved counterproductive. Instead of pacifying the population 
these actions incited even greater resistance.  
(3) Punishment operations could not generate subservience to a regime viewed as 
illegitimate by the majority of the Afghan population. 
These factors, acting in combination, frustrated Soviet attempts at achieving coercion 
through punitive bombardment.  
The determination of the mujahideen to resist the Soviet occupation rested in large part 
on their belief in Islam. The call for a jihad against the regime of Nur Taraki was a 
powerful force in initially mobilizing the resistance. The Soviet invasion galvanized the 
Muslim insurgency in terms of an apocalyptic battle between the defenders of the true 
faith and the kafir (infidel). The Russian occupation also stimulated Afghan nationalism, 
and revived the Afghans' historical antipathy to foreign domination. One mujahideen 
commander clearly expressed these sentiments by stating, "We are fighting for Islam but 
we should be fighting for Afghanistan as well."110 The twin ideologies of Islam and 
nationalism provided the metaphysical sustenance to the insurgency, and both proved 
nearly impervious to Soviet bullets and bombs.  
In terms of casualties inflicted, the Soviet campaign to punish the Afghan population was 
a decided success. Lester Grau and former Afghan General Mohammed Nawroz estimate 
the number of Afghan civilian casualties at 1.3 million.111 Vincent Cannistraro, 
Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, testified 
before a Congressional committee that Soviet operations resulted in "one million 
casualties to innocent civilians bombed by Soviet air power, dismembered by 
indiscriminate use of landmines, and shelled by Soviet artillery."112 In total, civilian 
deaths represented between 6 and 8 percent of the pre-war Afghan population.113 In 
addition, the number of Afghans affected by the Soviet use of "scorched earth" tactics 
and the prosecution of a policy of "migratory genocide" is equally staggering. 
Cannistraro estimated that the war produced over five million refugees with over three 
million sheltered in Pakistan alone.114 Despite the severity of these efforts, Soviet 
attempts to break the will of the Afghan people through punishment still failed to produce 
the desired strategic results. Muhammed Sadeqi, a mujahideen commander, stated, "We 
cannot be defeated . . .. Although we are short of arms, ammunition and food, and they 
are well equipped, we have determination on our side. They [the Russians] have no heart 
for the struggle."115 The rugged and fiercely independent Afghan character combined 
with religious faith to make the insurgents and the populace largely immune to Soviet 
terror and intimidation.  
The final factor involved in the failure of Soviet punishment operations centered on the 
perceived illegitimacy of the Soviet sponsored DRA regime, whether under the 
leadership of Babrak Karmal or Najibullah Ahmadzai. Trevor Fishlock, a journalist for 
The Times of London, aptly described the acceptance of the Karmal regime among the 
populace in the following words:  
The Karmal regime, weak and detested, is held up only by a framework of Russian arms 
and administration. Mr. Karmal, once known as a champion of people's causes, is a 
pariah in his own land. He keeps to his palace, presiding over a crumbling economy, a 
ramshackle and untrustworthy army, a dispirited civil service, a fleeing middle class and 
a truculent population.116
The mass desertions within the DRA armed forces provided one indication of the 
illegitimacy of the DRA regime. The DRA desertion rate averaged at least 10,000 men 
per year, leading one mujahideen commander to remark that "the [DRA] army is 
becoming like a room with two doors. You go in through one and leave through the 
other."117 The government's inability to prevent members of the armed forces from 
deserting led to the introduction of "press gangs" to provide sufficient manpower for the 
DRA military. These press gangs, much like their eighteenth-century predecessors, 
kidnapped and impressed young men into military service during sweeps of urban centers 
and rural villages.118 The periodic mutinies of Afghan army garrisons provided yet 
another indicator of the inherent illegitimacy of the Soviet-sponsored DRA regime.119 
One of the most dramatic examples involved a revolt on 12 June 1985, by Afghan pilots 
at Shindand airbase during which they destroyed 20 jets.120  
Soviet efforts aimed at the military infrastructure of the mujahideen proved as 
disappointing as their efforts to punish the Afghan population. The major factors 
contributing to the failure of these efforts included:  
(1) The availability of insurgent sanctuaries.  
(2) The failure of Soviet interdiction efforts.  
(3) The logistical parsimony of the mujahideen.  
(4) The small size of Soviet forces, especially counterinsurgency forces.  
(5) The lack of appropriate counterinsurgency doctrine.  
(6) The introduction of effective manportable SAM technology, thus negating Soviet air 
supremacy. 
First, the Soviets never succeeded in preventing the mujahideen from using Pakistan as a 
sanctuary, or in halting the flow of supplies from Pakistan into Afghanistan. Despite 
numerous Soviet diplomatic warnings and repeated air and artillery attacks, the Pakistani 
leadership refused to comply with Russian demands to close the border to the insurgents. 
The nature of the mujahideen logistics system and the insurgents' minimal requirements 
constituted two additional difficulties for Soviet military planners. The inability to 
successfully sever the mujahideen supply lines within Afghanistan constituted a major 
failure of the Soviet strategy. At the same time, the third element of Soviet failure, their 
underestimation of their adversary and a corresponding overestimation of the frangibility 
of his logistics infrastructure, also played a key role in contributing to the failure of the 
Soviet interdiction campaign. Arthur Bonner, an American journalist who traveled with 
the mujahideen in 1985, described the insurgents' use of small groups of men and animals 
for resupply. In one example, prior to crossing an exposed plain, a caravan consisting of 
700 men and hundreds of animals was divided "into groups of ten and sent forward at 
ten-minute intervals as a precaution in case of an air attack."121 Edward Cody, a 
journalist with The Washington Post, accompanied the mujahideen during an 11-day trek 
along one caravan route. During this trek, his party fluctuated between as few as two and 
as many as fifty members.122 The ability of the mujahideen to parcel-out their resupply 
columns complicated Soviet detection efforts, and prevented the Russians from finding 
lucrative or decisive interdiction targets.  
Furthermore, the Soviets seriously overestimated the insurgents' supply requirements. 
During the Korean War, the ability of a Communist Chinese division to operate on 50 
tons of supplies per day astounded American commanders and greatly complicated 
United Nations interdiction efforts.123 Later, during the war in Vietnam, the ability of 
over 200,000 Communist forces to operate on 380 tons per day practically doomed the 
American Rolling Thunder interdiction campaign to failure from its inception.124 In 
Afghanistan, the frugality of the mujahideen logistical requirements appears even greater 
than those of the Chinese and Vietnamese communists. The evidence concerning the 
parsimony of the mujahideen with respect to logistical requirements is anecdotal, as no 
written record of shipments and exact tonnage exists. The experience of numerous 
foreign observers with the insurgents is, however, instructive and convincing. Paul 
Overby discussed a typical dinner as consisting of flatbread, boiled beef, and potatoes 
cooked in a communal bowl with water being shared from a communal pitcher. In 
another example, Overby describes a breakfast of "stale" pieces of flatbread and 
oranges.125 In one case, a group of mujahideen existed on turnips and flatbread alone for 
six days.126 Numerous other accounts by Western observers indicate the ability of the 
mujahideen to operate on a diet centered on flatbread, lard and heavily sweetened tea.127 
These same observers also indicate the routine ability of the mujahideen to march for 12 
or 13 hours without a break through the rugged mountainous terrain.128 In the end, it 
was clear that the Soviets had greatly overestimated the logistical needs of their 
adversary.  
The fourth factor involved in the failure of Soviet military strategy centered on the small 
size of available regular and counterinsurgency forces. The small size of Soviet ground 
forces and the unwillingness of the Afghan army to fight greatly handicapped Soviet 
pacification efforts. Soviet forces, totaling between 118,000 and 120,000 men at the high 
point of the occupation, were clearly insufficient for gaining control over a largely 
mountainous country the size of Texas.129 The fact that only 20 percent of these forces 
were specially trained for counterinsurgency operations further limited the usefulness of 
the available manpower for this mission. Former US chargé d'affaires to Afghanistan, 
Charles Dunbar, stated that "the Soviets would have to bring in something in the order of 
a half-million men if they were to hope to do a great deal more than they are now [1983] 
in the way of suppressing the resistance."130 According to Dunbar, the Soviet 
leadership's failure to increase the size of the occupation force was based on their 
unwillingness to incur casualties, and a desire not to provoke renewed diplomatic 
protests. In practical terms, however, it is also doubtful that the Soviet logistical system 
could have sustained such a dramatic increase in personnel in Afghanistan.131  
Fifth, the absence of an appropriate counterinsurgency doctrine severely handicapped 
Soviet operations during the first three years of the war.132 Improvements in Soviet 
tactics for dealing with the insurgency included the increased use of helicopters and air 
assault techniques, the expanded employment of spetsnaz forces, and improved training 
and equipment for all forces. The Soviet army validated the usefulness of air assault 
techniques employing heliborne VDV and DShB forces. In fact, Soviet Major General 
Grekov, Chief of Staff of the 40th Army, identified the perfection of heliborne desant 
operations as the major lesson of the war.133 Spetsnaz forces successfully conducted a 
number of raids and ambushes in the course of the occupation. In addition, the war 
witnessed the introduction of new Soviet weapons systems including infantry fighting 
vehicles (BMP-2), mortars (Vasilek 82 mm), grenade launchers (AGS-17), aircraft (Su-25 
Frogfoot) and automatic weapons (ASU-74 assault rifle).134 In the end, however, 
improved Soviet counterinsurgency forces, techniques and equipment proved too little 
and too late.  
Finally, it was the mujahideen's acquisition of reliable and effective manportable surface-
to- air missiles that administered the coup de grace to Soviet military strategy in 
Afghanistan. The introduction of the Stinger missile clearly raised the ante beyond the 
Soviet ability to pay, although it did not significantly impact the Soviet decision to leave. 
Stinger's ability to neutralize the major source of Soviet military strength crippled the 
Russian interdiction efforts and allowed the mujahideen to mass their forces for the 
conduct of large-scale operations. Stinger clearly eroded the efficacy and accuracy of 
fixed-wing operations, and, in turn, it sounded the deathknell for heliborne attack, either 
in the form of air assault landings or attack aviation.135 The Stinger was equally decisive 
in its psychological impact among Soviet and DRA pilots. Stinger clearly achieved a high 
level of respect among Afghan and Soviet pilots, who became increasingly unwilling to 
expose themselves or their aircraft to its lethal envelope. The accuracy and effectiveness 
of subsequent air operations suffered even more from the exaggerated belief in both the 
availability and capabilities of this missile among Soviet and DRA pilots. The 
mujahideen played on Soviet fears by discussing their possession of Stinger missiles in 
radio communications, even if their group did not have the missile. The Soviets 
intercepted these communications and received an exaggerated picture of the availability 
of Stinger among the insurgent groups.136  
Implications for Contemporary Military Planners  
The failure of Soviet air and ground forces in the battle against the mujahideen provides a 
caution for contemporary military planners with respect to the employment of airpower in 
unconventional war. The Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, in his magnum 
opus On War, wrote:  
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and 
commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are 
embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its 
nature.137
Clausewitz's advice is as relevant today as it was in the nineteenth century. Political and 
military strategists must understand that unconventional warfare presents a multitude of 
unique difficulties and challenges concerning the employment of airpower. These 
difficulties are compounded by a decided penchant among modern armed forces for 
conventional military operations. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan clearly 
demonstrates that airpower can play a major role in unconventional operations. However, 
it alone does not constitute the instrument for achieving victory. Air and space assets can 
facilitate the attainment of superior firepower, adequate logistical sustainment, and 
improved intelligence and communication services, but the nature of the conflict and the 
determination of one's adversary form the crucial elements determining the success or 
failure of military operations.  
The mujahideen willingness to endure an enormous degree of punishment illustrates not 
only the limits of airpower, but the limits of military power as well. The mujahideen 
example demonstrates that there are situations when nothing short of the annihilation of 
one's adversary can lead to victory. However, genocide, whether conducted from the air 
or the ground, is morally indefensible and does not constitute a viable alternative for the 
contemporary Western military strategist. Not only the problem of direct, but also, 
indirect targeting is problematic in unconventional warfare. Soviet airpower could not 
strike "vital centers" that did not exist, nor could it create a vulnerability in a supply 
system designed to be invulnerable. American military planners experienced this same 
problem in their repeated efforts to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the war in 
Vietnam.138 If air and ground forces cannot effectively isolate the insurgents from their 
sources of supply, then only limited success in interdiction efforts may constitute a 
misallocation of resources. It may be possible to eliminate 80 percent of the insurgents' 
supply, but this is a pyrrhic victory if they require less than 20 percent to operate 
effectively.  
The advanced technology involved with contemporary intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR) systems offers an improved ability to view the modern battlespace. 
The increased "transparency" of the battlefield does not, however, necessarily translate 
into greater success in unconventional warfare. Unconventional warfare is in large part a 
political struggle aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the target state's population. 
Technology cannot determine which person or persons, in a household of five or fifteen, 
are sympathetic to the insurgents' cause. Nor can technology accurately predict the 
impact of a given military operation, or bombing strike, in either catalyzing increased 
opposition or breaking the enemy's will to fight. In the unconventional arena, technology 
remains a tool, and not a guarantee for success.  
Airpower, like technology, is but one of a number of tools for conducting unconventional 
operations. The mobility, intelligence and firepower provided by modern air assets can be 
decisive in attaining success at the tactical or operational level. These successes must, 
however, ultimately be translated into strategic victory. Soviet military planners in 
Afghanistan, like their American counterparts in Vietnam, learned that triumph on the 
battlefield does not necessarily result in political victory. In an insurgency environment, 
airpower is not a panacea, and it cannot compensate for a deficient political or military 
strategy. Experiences in Afghanistan and Vietnam demonstrate that neither 
unconventional warfare nor airpower are exempt from the Clausewitzian paradigm. The 
successful employment of military force in unconventional war requires both a clear 
understanding of the nature of the conflict as well as the limitations of airpower as an 
instrument for achieving limited political objectives--it is a lesson well worth noting.  
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